Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1965

Eastern Utah Development Company v. General
Insurance Company of America, A Corporation,
and Fred Reynolds : Respondent's Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Hanson & Garrett; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Eastern Utah Dev't Co. v. General Insurance Co. of America, No. 10359 (1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3610

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
EASTERN UT AH
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,

a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA,

Case No.
10359

a corporation, and

FRED REYNOLDS,
Defendants and Appellants.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

ApJ>eal from Judgment of the Third District
Court of Salt Lake County
The Honorable Merrill C. Faux, Judge
HANSON

& GARRETT

520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for
Plaintiff and Respondent

BAYLE, HURD & LAUCHNOR
1105 Continental Bank Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendants and
Appellants

I

INDEX
Page
.sTATEl\IE!\T OF KIND OF CASE ----------------------------

1

DISPOSITION I~ LOWER COURT ----------------------------

2

!!ELIEF SOGGHT ON APPEAL----------------------------------

2

3TA TEl\IENT OF FACTS --------------------------------------------

2

ARGTJl\IENT --- --- ---------------------------- -------- - --------------------

13

POI:\T I. THE DEFENDANT BONDING COMPANY
IS Fl-LL Y LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF AND
IS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNITY AGAINST
THE PLAINTIFF. ----------------------------------------------------

13

II. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PLAINTIFF
RElVIAINED A PARTNER WITH DEFENDANT, FRED REYNOLDS, WAS NOT BEFORE
THE LOWER COURT. --------------------------------------------

19

POINT III. THE COURT DID NOT ERROR IN
FAILING TO GIVE ANY OF DEFENDANTS'
REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS ON THEIR
THEORY OF THE CASE. ------------------------------------

21

POINT IV. THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR
IN FAILING TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY THE
ISSUE OF DAMAGES. --------------------------------------------

24

POINT V_ THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO SPECIAL
INTERROGATORIES WERE NOT INCONSISTENT. --------------------------------------------------------------------------

27

POINT VI. PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS ARE NOT LIMITED TO THAT OF AN ACCOUNTING FROM
DEFENDANT, FRED REYNOLDS. --------------------

29

CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------- ____________

30

POI~T

INDEX-Continued
CASES CITED
Baker vs. Cook, 6 Utah 2d 161, 308 P. 2d 264 _____________

Page
28

Hanks vs. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P. 2d 564 _ 21
Jennings et al vs. Pratt et al, 19 Utah 129, 46 P.
951 ------------------------------------------------------------------------15, 29, 30
Milligan vs. Capital Furniture Company, 8 Utah 2d
383, 335 P. 2d 619 ---------------------------------------------------- 29
New Hampshire Insurance Company vs. Ballard Wade,
Inc., et al, ____ Utah 2d ____ , 404 P. 2d 675 ________________ 19
Prows vs. Hawley, 72 Utah 444, 271 P. 31 ____________________ 16
School District No. 6 Wallowa County vs. Smith, 127
P. 7, 97 (Ore.) --------------------------------------------------·-·--· 19
Southern Surety Company vs. Platt, 28 F. 2d 698
( CCA 4th 1928) -·--·---------··--------·-----------·---···-·-··---··-··18
Spokane Union Stockyards Company vs. Maryland
Casualty Company, 178 P. 3 (Wash.) ---··-···-···----·-- 18
Utah Home Fire Insurance Company, 15 U. 2d 257,
391 P. 2d 290 ----··------·-··-·-----------------·--·----------····--·-·····
21
TEXTS CITED
90 A.L.R. 2d 1040 ---------------------------·--·---------------·--·-··-··---··---23
53 Am. Jur. Trials, Section 638 ------------·-------·-··--·--··-·--· 23
68 C.J .S., Section 12, Page 420 ------------·------------------------·-- 32
Moore's Federal Practice Second Edition, Section
22
49.03 ( 3) -------··----·--------·--------------------··-·------··----·---·-···-Rule 49 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure -----------------···

21

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
£ASTERN UT AH
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
a corpora ti on,
Plaintiff and Respondent:
vs.
GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA,
a corporation, and
FRED REYNOLDS,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
10359

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This action has for its background the construction of a concrete-lined irrigation ditch approximately 6 miles in length from the Koosharem
Reservoir to the town of Koosharem in Sevier County, Utah.
Plaintiff claims the sum of $29, 720.32 for
equipment rental and miscellaneous accounts from
defendant, Fred Reynolds, and his bonding company, General Insurance Company of America, for
rental and material consumed in the course of the
construction project. Plaintiff claims this amount
1

for ( 1) Breach of contract and in the alternafae
(2) Dam~ges for negligence by defendant, Fred
Reynolds, 111 the construction of the canal.
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT
The action was tried to a jury on Special Interrogatories. The jury found in favor of plaintiff
and judgment for plaintiff's claim in the amount
of $29,720.32 was entered by the Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek a reversal of the judgment.
an accounting between plaintiff and defendant Reynolds and an award to General Insurance Company
of America of its costs and attorney's fees against
plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts in the Brief of Appellants are as they contend them to be and not as
they must be viewed on appeal favorable to the verdict and hence a further statement in this Brief is
necessary.
Plaintiff is a corporation generally engaged
in the business of ready-mixed concrete, sand and
gravel, road gravels, and canal linings. It maintains
its principal place of business at Price, Utah (R.
118).
Defendant, Fred Reynolds, also resides in Price,
Utah and for many years has been a general con2

tractor. Over the years defendant Reynolds had
purchased concrete from the plaintiff and at the
time the Koosharem Canal Project came up, he was
contemplating the purchase of a stock interest in
Eastern Utah Development Company (R. 133).
In August or September, 1961, Eastern Utah
DeYelopment Company had received an invitation to
bid on the Koosharem job. Mr. Fausett, vice president of plaintiff, and Mr. Reynolds had discussed
the job in Mr. Fausett's office in Price, Utah in
that both had equipment that could be used on this
project ( R. 133). Later both Reynolds and Fausett
visited the Richfield office of the United States
Soil Conservation Service and obtained plans for
the project and at the same time both had visited
the project site and walked over it to determine
what special problems would be involved.
We digress at this point to explain the nature
of the work involved in concrete canal lining because
of its importance to plaintiff's theory of the case.
Old irrigation ditches in this state for the most
part were constructed without patient attention to
detail. The farmers simply didn't have the equipment necessary to properly construct a ditch. Consequently the gradient from water source to point
of use was often not uniform and this would materially decrease the volume of water that a ditch could
carry. Concrete linings of these canals if done properly increase the efficiency of the ditch, the volume
3

of water that it can carry, and they avoid watei·
loss through seepage.
Proper concrete lining construction require
that first the ditch be cleaned by removing roe~
and vegetation and then it must be cut deeper and
wider than the finished ditch will eventually be. This
rough cut is then completely filled with good clean
fill material free of large rocks and debris. This
fill is brought up to what will be the finished grade.
In construction parlance this is called the pad. The
ditch is then re-cut to proper depth and slope of
sides. This must be done in order that the concrete
lining will have a good compacted base. A boat or
slip form is then placed in the newly cut ditch and
pulled along the ditch as the concrete is poured
into the form and rolled off to the bottom and sides
of the new canal. Each of these steps must be done
precisely in order that the finished concrete ditch
will conform to the specifications. For instance, the
specifications of the Koosharem canal do not per·
mit a variance in grade of more than plus or minus
one-tenth of a foot in 100 feet ('R. 264).
The Koosharem ditch was cut with a parsons
cutter. This is essentially a trenching machine with
side cutters. As it moves along the ditch, it removes the newly placed fill material, throws it to
the side, and at the same time shapes the slope of
the sides of the ditch. If the old ditch has not ~n
properly cut and cleaned and if the fill material
is not free from rocks and debris, the cutter can·
4

not do its job properly. Improper cleaning of the
ditch and rocks and fill will cause the cutter to be
out of alignment or grade or both.
The proper construction of the pad has been
mentioned in detail at this point because the evidence shows conclusively that the pad was not constructed properly by defendant Reynolds and this
is what led to the difficulties that prompted this
law suit.
Continuing the history of this case, we find
that after the preliminary talks between Max Fausett and defendant Reynolds a bid for this job was
put together by these two and submitted to the
Koosharem Irrigation Company. Thereafter a contract to construct the cement-lined ditch was awarded to defendant Reynolds. Reference to Ex. 2d will
show that Mr. Reynolds entered into this contract
on his own. His is the only signature that appears
on the contract documents. At about the same time
(October or November, 1961), defendant Reynolds
obtained a bond from the defendant, General Insurance Company of America, for the payment of labor
and materials used on the project and to guaranty
performance of the contract. Reference to Exhibit
3d will show that defendant Reynolds is the only
principal named on the bond. In fact, at that time
the bonding company had no knowledge of any arrangements entered into by plaintiff and Fred Reynolds and, in fact, General Insurance Company of
America would not accept Eastern Utah Develop5

ment Company as a principal on the bond had
r .
ap~) icat10n been made therefor (See the testimony of
msurance agent, Dale Barton, R. 224).
Prior to the bidding of this construction project, plaintiff and defendant Reynolds had agreed
that each would contribute certain equipment to the
prosecution of the work and that plaintiff would
furnish two of its foremen, namely Jack World
and Frank Williamson, to supervise the construction of the pad, cutting the same, and pouring the
concrete.
After the contract was let to Mr. Reynolds and
a bond obtained by him, it was determined by plaintiff and Reynolds that the actual construction of
the pad should be sub-contracted to a contractor
in the Richfield area. For this purpose Mr. Fausett
and Mr. Reynolds went to Richfield the following
week (R. 146). Mr. Reynolds knew Mr. L.A. Young
who had the necessary equipment to construct the pad
and he advised Mr. Fausett that Mr. Young would
get on the job and get the work done. However, Mr.
Reynolds was never able to get Mr. Young on the
job to do that work (R. 206-207). Mr. Fausett was
unable to proceed in that regard because from the
moment the contract was signed, Mr. Reynolds took
the attitude that it was strictly his job and he would
depend on Mr. Young (R. 183). Thereafter Rey·
nolds never did get sufficient equipment on the job
to efficiently clean, fill, and grade the pad.
6

The only other work done during the winter of
1961-1962 was to stock-pile gravel from the reservoir to the construction site. This gravel haul was
pel'formed by the plaintiff.
In April of 1962 Mr. Reynolds moved his trailer

to the job site and commenced clearing the old ditch

in Section 5 which would be the section of the ditch
fartherest from the reservoir (R. 148-149). (For
convenience the construction project was divided
into 5 sections running consecutively from the reservoir to the town of Koosharem-Ex. 6). After Mr.
Reynolds had been there for a short period, he and
Mr. Fausett had a telephone conversation. Rather
than just clean out the old ditch, Mr. Reynolds indicated that he had run into real good fill dirt and
had used it to back fill practically all of Section 5.
Three or four days later during the first part
of May, 1962 Mr. Fausett visited the job site and
found that Mr. Reynolds had back filled the most
part of Section 5 ( R. 152). The back filling done
by Mr. Reynolds appeared to be too rocky and Mr.
Fausett again explained to Mr. Reynolds, as he
had before any construction started, that rocky fill
material would cause the cutter to jam and be out
of alignment and grade and the resulting ditch
would not pass the Government specifications (R.
153). At that time Mr. Reynolds assured Mr. Fausett that he would not use that type of material in
the rest of the construction and that he would permit the plaintiff's supervisors, Jack World and
7

Frank 'Villiamson, to run the actual construction
of the pad (R. 155).
Mr. Fausett visited the construction site several days later at a time when the pad in Section 5
constructed by Mr. Reynolds was being cut (R.
156). At that time Mr. Fausett observed that the
cutter was cutting material that was full of rocks
that the cutter was being bumped and jarred, that'
the resulting ditch was jagged and rocky, and the
ditch was not suitable for the concrete pour that
was to follow. This observation can be readily seen
by reference to Ex. 1p which is a photograph showing the cutter in operation on the Section 5 pad that
was constructed by Reynolds. Again he and Mr.
Reynolds had a conversation and Mr. Fausett stated
to him that they could not tolerate the type of material the cutter encountered in the pad. Mr. Reynolds replied that he could see that, but also stated
that he would have better material in the future (R.
158).
At a further time in June of 1962, in response
to a call from the men on the job, Mr. Fausett again
visited the project site. At this time approximately
20 per cent of the pad had been cut. His testimony
cncerning what he found at that time is significant.
"Q.

When you got there, what did you observe?
"A. I found that the same conditions e~isted
that - the rocks were still th~re m t~e
pad - the center line of the ditch - in
8

fact, in some instances, it was not even
kept track of.
"They were even cutting out away from
the old ditch, the dirt that had not even
been disturbed; also, there was not grade
stakes for the cutter to follow. The pad
was too narrow."
He further found that the cutter was working
much less than its potential capacity, that they were
cutting only from 140 to 160 feet per day, and the
cutter should have been making from 600 to 800
feet per day. The cause, of course, was simply that
the cutter could not cut the rocky material that defendant Reynolds had been using to construct the
pad ( R. 161 ) .
On that day the most important event of this
case occurred. Mr. Fausett and Mr. Reynolds had
a meeting in Mr. Reynolds' trailer and at that time
Mr. Fausett stated his dissatisfaction with the way
Mr. Reynolds was running the job and informed Mr.
Reynolds that he wanted no further part of it and
that he was pulling off the job. He told Mr. Reynolds that he wanted no part of the profits on the
job and would no longer be responsible for the results because Reynolds was going to get in trouble
if he continued with the methods he had been using.
Mr. Reynolds replied that he was bonded and that
he could not finish the job without the cutter. Mr.
Fausett then stated that he would leave the cutter
and the other equipment on the job providing that
9

Mr. Reynolds would agree to maintain the cutter
and pay for the equipment rental and continue to
pay the labor and material accounts that had been
agreed to. Mr. Reynolds agreed to this providing
Mr. Fausett would leave the cutter on the job and
also plaintiff's employee, Jack World (R. 162).
Mr. Reynolds admits that such a meeting occurred and that he was informed by Mr. Fausett
that Eastern Utah Development Company was pulling off the job. He does not admit the change in the
original agreement, but did admit that the subject
of rental payment was discussed (R. 397).
The testimony of Mr. Fausett and Mr. Reynolds
framed the single most important issue in the case
and that is whether the agreement between Eastern
Utah Development Company and Mr. Reynolds had
been changed as a result of the meeting that took
place in June of 1962. The jury resolved this issue
in favor of the plaintiff.
In the Special Verdict given to the jury, the
following question was given and the following an·
swer given:
"2. In the said talk between Mr. Fausett
and Mr. Reynolds, did they agree th~t
their original agreement would be m~di·
fied in the future conduct of the JOb,
in that Eastern Utah Development Com·
pany's equipment. would. remain on~~
job until complet10n of it, ~ut that m
stead of sharing in the profits, Eastern
Utah Development Company would re·
10

ceive from M;r. Re~nolds rental payments for said eqmpment during its
use?
Answer: Yes
Signed:

Everett A. Bird
Foreman"

Support for the jury's finding of an agreement
between the plaintiff and Mr. Reynolds is found in
the testimony of Mr. Fausett and also payments
made to plaintiff by defendant Reynolds. From the
time construction first started, Mr. Fausett would
contact Mr. Reynolds about every 30 to 60 days
concerning payments of the various accounts. Each
time Mr. Reynolds would receive estimates from the
Canal Company, he would make a payment to Eastern Utah Development Company without specifying
any application of funds and at no time did he deny
his agreement to pay the various accounts including the rental account (R. 172 and Ex. 26d).
After the meeting between the two principals
in this case in June of 1962, Mr. Reynolds remained
on the job and finished it. The following year in the
spring of 1963 it became necessary for him to make
some corrections on the work he had completed. Mr.
Reynolds contacted Mr. Fausett and asked if Mr.
World would accompany him to Richfield for this
purpose. This was agreed to providing Mr. Reynolds
paid Mr. World's salary and made an agreement
11

with him concerning his subsistence. Mr. Reynolds
agreed to this and Mr. World did work on the job
site in the spring of 1963. Part of his salary was
paid by Mr. Reynolds. (See Exhibit 26d for pay.
ments to lVfr. \Vorld in May and June of 1963.)
Even after this corrective work was done, the job
did not meet the Government's specifications. Mr.
Harold Brown the Government engineer assigned to
this project testified ( R. 263-268) that the specifications permitted only 1/10 of a foot in 100 feet
out of grade. Later the canal company decided to
allow a plus or minus 2/10 of a foot in 100 feet to
push the project along, but even so the gradient of
the ditch exceeded this tolerance in many instances
- Section 1 - 36 per cent; Section 2 - 38 per cent;
Section 3 - 21 per cent; Section 4 - 30 per cent; and
Section 5 - 25 per cent. The project also called for
certain concrete structures that were the responsibility of Mr. Reynolds. We refer the Court to Exhibits 12, 13, and 14 which are photographs of certain of these structures taken in the spring of 1963,
less than a year after Mr. Reynolds did the work.
They quite clearly depict very poor construction
methods as the concrete is severely cracked and
broken.
The above is a history of this matter. When Mr.
Reynolds stopped making payments on Plaintiff's
account this lawsuit was commenced.
12

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE DEFENDANT BONDING COMPANY IS
FULLY LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF AND IS NOT
ENTITLED TO INDEMNITY AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF.

Points I and III of appellants' Brief contain
common or related questions of law and are, therefore, appropriately argued under a single point.
In appellants' first and most extensively arfued point, the defendant bonding company says the
action against it should be dismissed as a matter of
law. The two defendants made common cause
against the Complaint of plaintiff in the lower court,
but now the bonding company seeks to cut its principal, the defendant Reynolds, adrift and asked that
it be absolved from any liability concerning the bond
it wrote guaranteeing completion of the Koosharem
Canal Company job and payment for materials and
supplies so far as concerns the claim of plaintiff.
It says in effect that since plaintiff started the
project as a joint venture with its principal, Fred
Reynolds, that plaintiff too is a principal and cannot claim the benefits of the bond. No cases of guaranty or suretyship are cited to the Court. It ignores
the facts of the case. Indeed its thinking is stratified in certain legal principles of partnership which
have little or no application to this case.
It fails to mention that the Koosharem contract

was awarded to Fred Reynolds alone; the bond was
13

written in his name alone as principal; whatever
contract existed between Reyonolds and the plain.
tiff was unknown to defendant bonding companv
when it issued its bond; and all funds from the o~
er were received by their principal Reynolds, deposited in his account, and drawn on his sole signature.
A detailed analysis of the facts of this case will
show that the bonding company is liable. It is true
that plaintiff and defendant Reynolds started the
project as a joint venture. However, from the very
first the aspects of partnership were missing. Joint
control did not exist. Defendant Reynolds assumed
control of the project immediately to the exclusion
of the plaintiff ( R. 183). He took the contract in
his own name. (Ex. 2d) . The bond was issued in
his name alone (Ex. 3d). Early in the game Reynolds made it abundantly clear to the Government
engineers that he was the contractor on the job.
Mr. Harold Brown, the project engineer employed
by the United States Soil Conservation Service, tes·
tified:
"A. He (Reynolds) told me in words to ~e
effect that he was the contractor on this
job; that all order~ would be gi~en to
him and he was gomg to run the JOb as
his ~ork as he saw fit, and I was to have
no conn~ction in any way with Eastern
Utah Development Company." (R. 263)
Reynolds agreed to pay and in fact did P.ay
for all or part of all labor and material accounts m·
14

eluding those of plaintiff. (Ex. 26d - See also the
testimony of defendant Reynolds, R. 382.)
Further as expressly found by the jury in this
case, defendant Reynolds agreed to pay the rental
account of plaintiff and in considerati·on plaintiff
claimed no profits on the job ( R. 54 - 57). It is just
the same as if the defendant Reynolds had hired
the equipment of some third person to complete the
job. This being the case the bonding company becomes liable to the plaintiff just as it would be liable
to any other third party. This is particularly true
when by its own evidence it admits that it had no
knoweledge of plaintiff's interest in the contract
and placed no reliance on the plaintiff's credit. But
on the other hand, they wrote the bond solely in the
name of its principal, Fred Reynolds, and relied
solely on his indemnity agreement.
In point is the case of Jennings et al vs. Pratt
et al, 19 Utah 129, 46 P. 951. This was a suit to
collect a promissory note. Evidence developed that
one of the plaintiffs seeking relief was a member
of the partnership and association that executed
the note. Defendants argued that the action could
not be maintained and that plaintiffs' only remedy
was a suit for contribution. The Court ruled:
"The rule is doubtless well settled that, in the
absence of a settlement of accounts, one partner cannot sue another at law upon a demand which has grown out of a partnership
transaction, but when the claim of one part15

ne1: agains.t co:partners arises out of a ti·ans.
act10n which is not properly a pa1tnershi
matter, the rule does not apply. Nor is ther~
any .s~und reason why ~ partner should be
P.roh1b1ted from transactmg business with his
firm, the sa1:1e a~ any o!her person; and when
the transact~on is ?Ot intended as a part of
a partnership business? or to be accounted
for as such, no reason is apparent why such
partner should not be entitled to the same
remedy as another individual would be
"\Vhere partners have seen fit to deal ~ith
each other without reference to the final accounting, . the transaction is not subject to
the necess1 ty or delay of such an accounting."
See also Prows vs. Hawley, 72 Utah 444, 271
P. 31.
Associated closely with the bonding company's
claim that it should be dismissed as a matter of law,
is its claim that plaintiff is bound to indemnify it
as argued under its Point III. The legal obligation
of indemnity is merely assumed by the defendant
bonding company. They cite no authoritative cases
nor does it present any arguments as to why legally
this obligation should exist.
The fact of the matter is that the indemnity
agreement (Ex. 33d) that the bonding company
relies on is dated 11 July 1960 and signed by Fred
M. Reynolds and Charlotte J. Reynolds. It is dated
long before the contract for the Koosharem Canal '
Company was let and long before any negotiations
between plaintiff and defendant Reynolds concern·
ing the construction of the canal. The bonding com·
16

pany had no knowledge of any interest of plaintiff
in the contract with Koosharem Canal Company;
its placed no reliance on its credit; and would not
under any circumstances issue it a bond. There is
no legal reason why a partner cannot deal with a
partnership as any third person providing it is
understood that the item of business is not treated
by the partners as partnership business which is
this case.
Cul'iously on the one hand, the bonding company says that Eastern Utah Development Company
is a principal on the bond and thus estopped from
claiming under the bond. It welcomes the plaintiff
as a principal for this purpose. On the other hand,
it says that it would not accept Eastern Utah DeYelopment Company as a principal on any bond in
any case. The bonding company agent, Mr. Dale
Barton, testified.
The bank in Price had called us to see
if we would license them to handle bonds
for them, and he was mentioned - Mr.
Hill mentioned Eastern Utah Development Company.
"vV e then, of course, obtained credit information, and it was very poor. We
were not interested in handling the account."
The stance assumed by the bonding company is
to say the very least awkward.
~,A.

The contention of the bonding company regarding indemnity finds no support in the law. In the
17

case of Southern Surety Conipany vs. Plott 28 F
2d 698 ( CCA . 4th 1928), one of the partne~s in ~
road construct10n company obtained a contract with
the State in its own name and also a bond from th
piaintiff in its own name. There was no evidenc:
that the plaintiff surety company knew of the partnership. After the surety company incurred a loss
on the project, it brought action against each of
the partners for reimbursement. A demurrer to the
Complaint in the lower court was affirmed on appeal. The appellant court held that a surety can
obtain indemnity or reimbursement only from that
person who is a principal on the bond and a party
to the indemnity agreement. The Court quoted with
approval Pingrey on Suretyship, Section 179:
"The surety can look for reimbursement only
to the rights of his principal, and not to a
stranger. Where a surety is on the bond of
one of several partners, he cannot look to the
partnership for indemnity, if he has to pay
the debt, though the bond was given to secure
a partnership debt. A surety cannot charge
any other person as his principal exc~pt the
one who is principal at the time of making t~e
contract of suretyship. No privity .can e~1st
between the parties except that w:h1ch. arises
on the bond or contract, and an implied assumpsit cannot arise beyond the partners on
the bond or in the contract."
In accord with the principle announced in the above
case, are Spokane Union Stockyards Company ~s:
Maryland Casualty Company, 178 P. 3 (Wash. '
18

and School District No. 6 of Wallowa County vs.
Smith, 127 P. 7, 97 (Ore.).

For an analogous Utah case, see the recent case
of Neu: Hmnpshire Insurance Company vs. Ballard
Trade, Inc., et al, ---- Utah 2d ____ , 404 P. 2d 675. In
that case the plaintiff fire insurance company paid
a fire loss to the lessor of property and sought to
recover from the lessee on the lessee's agreement with
the lessor to indemnify for loss. The Court stated
in part:
"That when the assignee here has accepted
a consideration to cover a risk, it hardly lies
in its mouth to claim indemnity from one who
has made a written guaranty against loss, to
which agreement the insurance company was
neither a party nor expressly or impliedfy a
beneficiary, ... "
POINT II.
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PLAINTIFF REMAINED A PARTNER WITH DEFENDANT, FRED REYXOLDS, \VAS NOT BEFORE THE LOWER COURT.

The issue before the lower court was whether
plaintiff and defendant Reynolds had terminated or
modified their agreement to the extent that plaintiff would give up its claim to partnership profits
in exchange for payment by defendant Reynolds of
its rental account. The jury on special interrogatories specifically found that the agreement was
modifed to this extent and that the parties did agree
that plaintiff would give up its claim to partnership
19

profits in exchange for payment by Reynolds of its
rental account.

In Point II of appellants' Brief, it is urged
that the Court erred in failing to rule as a matter of
law that plaintiff remained a partner for the pur.
pose of winding up partnership business. This point
cannot be related to any finding of the jury (R. 54.
5'7) or to any action of the trial judge. (Reproduced ,
herein as Appendix "A" is the Memorandum Decision of the lower court which concisely set.s forth
the claims of the parties, the issues, and the re- '
suits.) Appellants cite no portion of the Record
where this point is raised. Whether or not plaintiff
is a partner seems to be a moot point because the
jury found that the agreement was not terminated,
but modified.
1

Appellants do however make statements in Point
II of their Brief concerning certain evidence in the
case which must be challenged.

On Page 16 of appellants' Brief, they state that
plaintiff admits that Reynolds protested the plain·
tiff's leaving the job and cite Pages 162, 364-366
in support thereof. Page 162 of the Brief contains '
the testimony of Mr. Fausett and this testimony
is to the effect that defendant agreed to the new
arrangements wherein he would run the job and
pay the plaintiff its equipment rental. Pages 364·
366 of the Record contain the testimony of defend·
ant Reynolds which differs from the testimony of
20

l

Mr. Fausett only in that Mr. Reynolds states that

he did not agree to the new arrangement.

Again on Page 16 of appellants' Brief, they
state:
"The evidence clearly shows that the plaintiff did not reach a mutual understanding
\vith defendant Reynolds concerning the termination of the partnership."
The same pages of the Record, namely Pages 162,
364-366, are cited. The evidence is not as clear as
appellants would have this Court believe. In fact,
the testimony of these two men frame the disputed
issue as to what understanding was reached and
the jury decided that question in favor of the plaintiff.

POINT Ill.
THE counT DID NOT ERROR IN FAILING TO
GIVE ANY OF DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS ON THEIR THEORY OF THE CASE.

The lower court submitted this case to the jury
on special interrogatories pursuant to Rule 49 (a)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Submission
to the jury in this manner is discretionary with the
Court. Hanks vs. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354
P. 2d 564; Utah Home Fire Insurance Company,
15 U. 2d 257, 391 P. 2d 290. It should be added that
where, as in a case like this, the evidence is lengthy
and the issues complex, it is desirable that the jury
be asked to answer specific questions rather than
reach a general verdict after a lengthy complicated
21

set of instructions. In Moore's Federal Pr t'
. .
S .
ac ice,
Secon d Ed it10n,
ecbon 49.03 (3), it is stated:
"Use .of the special verdict eliminates the

~ecessity for and us~ of complicated instruc.
~ions on the law, which are a normal concom.
itan~ of th~ g~neral verdict ... When the
special. verdict is used, the C~urt should give

t? the JU~J' only such explanat10n and instruc.

tions as i~ dee~s nece.ssa~J' to enable the jurv
to make mtelhgent fmdmgs upon the issue's
of facts submitted."

Appellants in this action say the Court com.
mitted reversible error in failing to give any of
their requested instructions, respecting their theory
of the case. We are not told in their Brief what particular theory of law they are referring to nor have
they shown in what manner they have been pre·
judiced thereby. They do state that the Court failed
to inform the jury of the rights and duties of part·
ners to each other in the performance of partner·
ship obligations and failed to instruct the jury as
to the rights and duties of the partners in regard '
to the bonding company and a failure to instruct
on the obligations of partners in winding up part·
nership business. In reply, respondent asserts that
each of the matters set forth by appellants are mat·
ters of law for the determination of the Court and I
not matters of fact with which a jury need be con·
cerned. Further, the issues in this case are whet~er
or not defendant Reynolds agreed to pay the plam·
tiff for its equipment rental and whether he was
1
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negligent in the prosecution of the construction
project. The matters raised by appellants in their
Brief and their requested instructions are concerned
with law that is outside the scope of those issues.
Aside from the considerations above there is
even a more fundamental answer to appellants' contention of error in failing to give their requested
instructions. In 53 Am. J ur. Trials, Section 638,
it is stated:
"Where a special verict is required, it is improper to instruct the jury generally concerning the law of the case, for the reason that
inasmuch as the jury are not to apply the law
to the facts, instructions as to the law can
serve no useful purpose."
It would have been reversible error had the
Court given a general charge on the rights and
duties of the parties and the effect their answers
to special interrogatories would have had on those
rights and duties, 90 A.L.R. 2d 1040. Analysis of
the requested instructions of the appellants will
show that this is exactly what they sought by their
requested instructions. In other words, the requested
instructions state principles of law which would
have informed the jury as to the effect of their
answers to special interrogatories or upon the ultimate rights or liabilities of the parties and the final
judgment in the litigation, which is improper.
The special verdict given by the lower court
and the general instructions as to the burden of
23

proof accurately and adequately framed th ·
e issue

.
.
f or the Jury.
There is no error.
POINT IV.

THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
ING TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY THE ISSUE
AGES.

OF ~AAMIL.

Plaintiff in this action claims from the defendant the sum of $29, 720.32. This amount is
made up of the following accounts:
R. 383
Ex. 7
Ex. 8
Ex. 9
Ex. 10
Ex. 11

Parsons Cutter
Miscellaneous Accounts
Labor Account
Equipment Rental
Gravel Haul
Cement Account
TOTAL

$ 600.00
311.14

1,177.03
19,886.79
6,889.25
856.11
$29,720.32

Plaintiff claimed this amount on two theorfos.
Namely, that the defendant, Fred Reynolds, had
agreed to pay the accounts and had breached his
agreement and that defendant Reynolds was neglifent in the management and operation of the con·
struction project and caused damage to plaintiff
in the amount of the above accounts. In each theory
plaintiff claims the same amount.
In their Fifth Point of Argument, defendanra
contend that the jury found both plaintiff and defendant Reynolds guilty of negligence in the com·
. tiff
mencement of the project, but that after plain .
abandoned the project, Reynolds was free of negli·
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gence. Hence, plaintiff can claim no damages and
the Court committed error. in awarding damage.
Defendants overlook the fact that the jury did
find that Reynolds had breached his agreement and,
therefore, plaintiff was entitled to a judgment in
the amount of its account. No error was committed
by the lower court in finding plaintiff was entitled
thereto as a matter of law. There can be no question
concerning the accuracy and completeness of plaintiff's accounts. In each instance an original invoice
was made on or near the time of the event in question. At the end of each month a copy of the invoice
and a copy of the ledger account was mailed to defendant Reynolds (R. 164). On numerous occasions
during and after the completion of the project, Mr.
Fausett asked Mr. Reynolds for money on the accounts and periodically from the start of the job
until after its completion unspecified payments in
lump sums were made. The last payment was February 13, 1963.
The only account questioned in this law suit
is the equipment rental account, Ex. 9. Mr. Reynolds
had already agreed to pay other accounts (R. 168).
At trial defendants offered no evidence in explanation or denial of the items set forth on plaintiff's Exhibit 9. Instead defendant Reynolds introduced an Exhibit 31 ( d) prepared by himself and
his son (Ex. 31d) for the purpose of trial which
merely reflected defendant Reynold's memory con25

cerning .the time the equipment of the plaintiff w
on the JOb. He testified:
~
"Q.

Now, you claim this was made up fr
your own records?
om
"A. Yes Sir.
"Q. Where are they?
"A. In my head I guess."
Comparison on the Exhibits shows that the
defendant Reynolds admits the sum of $14,889.00
owed on the equipment rental account as compared
to $19,886. 79 as shown by plaintiff's Exhibit 9.
Further comparison will show that defendant has
simply rounded off the length of time the equipment
was on the job and omitted other periods of time
that were recorded by plaintiff at or near the time
of the event. Obviously these periods of time were
forgotten by defendant during the period between
the completion of the project and this law suit.
If the question had been submitted to the jury,
they could return only one amount for the other
if they found for the plaintiff. Necessarily one ac·
count or the other had to be rejected. To accept
defendant's memory, the jury would have to ignore
the actual records of plaintiff made at the time or
near the occurrence of the event. They would have
to further ignore the fact that defendant had received monthly statements of the account and had
made general unspecified payments to plaintiff after
the account was rendered. Such a verdict would
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have been speculative and against the manifest
weight of the evidence. These paramount factors
made this issue a matter of law for the Court and
,vas correctly withheld from the jury.
POINT V.
THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES WERE NOT INCONSISTENT.

Appellants in Point VI. of their Brief argue
that the jury's answers to Interrogatories #2 and
.;:t-3 are inconsistent and, therefore, should be totally
disregarded. These two Interrogatories and the answers given by the jury are as follows:
"2.

In the said talk between Mr. Fausett
and Mr. Reynolds, did they agree that
their original agreement would be modified in future conduct of the jo!?,, in that
the Eastern Utah Development l.iompany
equipment would remain on the job until
completion of it, but that instead of
sharing in the profits, Eastern Utah Development Company would receive from
Mr. Reynolds rental payments for said
equipment during its use?
Answer Yes
Everett A. Bird
Foreman

"3.

In the meeting between Mr. Fausett and
Mr. Reynolds, did they agree that their
original arrangement would be completely terminated as of that time; that Mr.
Reynolds would take the job over him27

self, .but that M~·· Reynolds would
permitted to continue to use the eq .be
ment of Eastern Utah Developm1:;
Company on a rental-payment basis
'
Answer No
Everett A. Bird
Foreman"
The import of the two questions is ( 1) Whether
the parties agreed to modify their original agree.
men t, or ( 2) Whether they agreed to terminate their
original agreement. There is substantial evidence
in the Record to support an affirmative answer to
each of the questions. Only if the jury had answered
"yes" to each question would there have been a con·
tradiction.
The testimony of Mr. Fausett shows that at
the June meeting of the two parties it was then
agreed that plaintiff would leave its equipment on
the job until its completion, but that instead of
sharing profits, Mr. Reynolds would make rental
payments to Eastern Utah Development Company.
This evidence is entirely consistent with the jury's
affirmative answer to Question #2.
Appellants made no specific objection to the I
form of Questions No. 2 and 3 nor did they contend I
that they were confusing or that answers thereto ~
could be contradictory. In the case of Baker ·vs.
Cook, 6 Utah 2d 161, 308 P. 2d 264, this Court
held that under a similar Record, these matters
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could not be raised for the first time on appeal. See
also the case of Milligan vs. Capital Furniture Company, 8 Utah 2d 383, 335 P. 2d 619 for a discussion
of the matter of inconsistency in answers on a
special verdict.
POINT VI.
PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS ARE NOT LIMfTED TO
THAT OF AN ACCOUNTING FROM DEFENDANT,
FRED REYNOLDS:

At the time of the trial of this action, the irrigation company had paid to defendant Reynolds
approximately $100,000.00 and there was still due
and owing to him the sum of approximately
$39,000.00. (R. 321).
Defendant Reynolds alone signed the contract
with the irrigation company. He alone has the power
to deal with them and if necessary, to obtain the
money still due and owing by legal process.
Again the Court is directed to the Utah case
of Jennings et al vs. Pratt et al (supra) where this
statement is made:
"Where partners have seen fit to deal with
each other without reference to the final accounting, the transaction is not subject to the
necessity or delay of such an accounting."
The facts in this case show that the parties
agreed that Reynolds would pay the accounts of
plaintiff and that plaintiff would waive any claim
for profits to be made on the job. By this agreement, these accounts were not intended as part of
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the. partnersh~p pay~1ents and, hence plaintiff had
a right to brmg act10n therefor prior to the time
that Reynolds
had
.
. collected the balance due 0n the
cons t rue t 10n proJect.
More specifically, appellants did not ask f01.
.
. t he 1ower court. They merely as.
an account ing
in
ser~ed. that this was the only remedy available to
plaintiff (see Pre-Trial Order - R. 46). The judg.
ment of the lower court is without prejudice to an
accounting (see appendix A). In view of this reservation and the holding of Jennings v. Pratt (supra)
there is no error.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff brought this action for the collection
of its account in the amount of $29,720.32. Its theories were ( 1) That defendant breached an agreement to pay said account and (2) That defendant
was negligent in his construction efforts and thus
caused plaintiff damage in the amount of its account. The Court submitted the questions to the
jury on a special verdict and the jury found that
defendant had agreed to make payment of the
account. Accordingly, judgment was awarded to
the plaintiff.
Based upon defendant's agreement to pay and
plaintiff's waiver of any claim for profits out of
the Job the parties have treated the matter~ be'
ing outside
the scope of the partnersh"ip busi nes.5
0

30

and hence, an accounting for this item is unnecessary.
The agreement of defendant to pay the account
places the plaintiff on the same footing as any other
third party furnishing labor and materials to a
construction project and the bonding company is,
therefore, liable on its performance and completion
bond. It cannot set up the bar of indemnity because
it has no indemnity agreement with the plaintiff.
It cannot set up the bar of partnership because it
had no knowledge of plaintiff's interest in the contract and would not have accepted plaintiff as a
principal on the bond in any event, and the parties
treated this account as an item outside the partnership business.
It relied strictly on the ability and financial
capacity of defendant, Fred Reynolds, and cannot
be heard to complain if compelled to pay for labor
and materials that its principal, Reynolds, agreed
to pay.
No error was committed by the lower court in
the conduct of the trial and the verdict of the jury
and judgment of the Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT
520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for
Plaintiff and Respondent
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